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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE ST A TE OF UT AH, 
-vs. -
ROBERT LEE DIXON, 




WEBER COUNTY, a body corporate and 
politic of the State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
- VS. -
DENNIS A. HUNTER, 




SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate 






Brief of Respondent Summit County 
NATURE OF CASE 
Motion was made to the District Court of Summit 
County, State of Utah, by Appellants, in the case entitled 
"State of Utah v. Demus A. Hunter,'' for issuance of an 
order awarding them a reasonable attorney's fee in con-
nection with their court-appointed representation of De-
1 
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fendant Dennis A. Hunter and requiring Respondent to 
compensate them for the fair and reasonable value of 
their services (R. 55). Appellants contended that Re-
spondent was legally obligated under Chapter 64 of Title 
77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, added by Chapter Laws 
of 1965, to pay them for said services. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LO-WER COURT 
The Honorable Merrill C. Faux, Judge of the Dis-
trict Court of Summit County, State of Utah, denied 
Appellants' motion (R. 75). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the decision of the District 
Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Where the word ''Respondent'' is used in this brief 
it refers to Summit County and where the word ''Appel-
lants" is used it refers to Robert M. McRae of Hatch 
and McRae. Where the word ''Def end ant'' is used it will 
refer to Dennis A. Hunter. 
Respondeut agrees with the statement of facts set 
forth in Appellants' brief, but feels it important to add 
that Appellants were appointed to represent Dennis A. 
HuntC'r by the District Court of Summit County with-
out the authorization of the Board of County Commis-
sioners of Summit County. 
2 
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POINT I 
A COUNTY OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAS 
NO STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO PAY 
TIE}tSOX~\BLE CO~[PENSATION AND EX-
PEN"SES TO COUR'r-APPOINTED DEFENSE 
COUNSEL, BUT MAY DO SO WHERE THE 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF 
SUCH CUNTY AUTHORIZES THE COURT 
TO APPOINT A QUALIFIED ATTORNEY IN 
EACH CASE AND AWARD HIM REASON-
ABLE COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES. 
Sections 1 and 2 of Title 77, Chapter 64, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, (cited at pages 5 and 6 of Appellants' 
brief) declare certain "minimum standards" to be pro-
\'ided hy each county for the defense of defendants who 
are financially unable to obtain an adequate defense in 
eriminal cas<'S. Section 2 provides: 
''Assigned counsel shall represent each indi-
gent person who is under arrest or charged with 
a crime in which the penalty to be imposed could 
be confinement for more than six months in either 
jail or prison if: 
( 1) The defendant requests it, or 
(2) The court, on its own motion or other-
wise, so orders, and the defendant does not affirm-
atively reject of record the opportunity to be 
represented.'' 
This Court in the case of Ruckenbrod v. M11lli11s, 102 
et ah 548, 133 P. 2d 325, (1943) said at page 326, P. 2d: 
''The majority of jurisdictions hold that an 
attonwv is an officer of the court with many rights 
and privileges, and must accept his office cum 
3 
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onere. One of the burdens incident to the office 
recognized by custom of the courts for man; 
years, is the duty of the attorney to render his 
services gratuitously to indigent defendants at 
the suggestion of the court.'' 
We concur with the statement at page 8 of Appel-
lants' brief that "it is fundamental now that a person 
who has not intelligently and completely waived his 
rights the counsel, and requests the court for appoint-
ment of counsel, is entitled to have an attorney represent 
him at all stages of the proceedings against him.'' How-
ever, we do not concur withe Appellants' contention that 
there is a mandatory obligation to provide such services 
at county expense. Title 77, Chapter 64, Section 6, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
''The board of county commissioners may, at 
county expense, either: 
"(1) Authorize the court to provide the serv-
ices prescribed by this act by appointing a quali-
fied attorney in each case and awarding him rea-
sonable compensation and expenses; or 
'' ( 2) Arrange to provide t ho s e services 
through nonprofit legal aid or other associations. 
If any incorporated city or tovm. wishes to do-
nate moneys for any of the purposes specified in 
this section, such action is hereby authorized.'' 
Appellants' principal argument apparently recog-
nizes and admits that the Board of County Commission-
ers of Summit County has neither authorized any Court 
to provide the services permitted by the act by appoint-
ing a qualified attorney in each case and awarding him 
reasonable compensation and expenses, nor arra11ged to 
4 
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provide those serYices through nonprofit legal aid or 
other associations. Appellants contend, however, that 
the Court may, even absent any such action on the part of 
the Beard of County Commissioners, appoint an attorney 
i11 cacl. case awl a ward him reasonable compensation and 
expenses anc{ that it is then mandatory that said Board 
of County Commissioners pay such compensation and 
expenses. 
The principal question before this Court "·oulcl ap-
pear to be whether the wording of Section 6 of the act 
is mandatory or permissive on the question of compen-
sation and expense reimbursement. It is fundamental 
law that a statute is to be construed in light of the legis-
lative intent. See McKesson v. Lowery, 51 C. 2d 660, 335 
P. 2d 662, California (1959). Before the enactment of 
Chapter 64 Title 77, Utah law did not authorize the coun-
ties to disburse funds to counsel appointed to represent 
indigent defendants in criminal cases. Title 17, Chapter 
l 3, Section 17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that 
the following are county charges: 
"(1) Charges incurred against the county by 
virtue of any of the provisions of law. 
"(2) The necessary expenses of the county 
attornev incurred in criminal cases arising in the 
county,·· and all other expenses necessarily in-
curred by him in the prosecution of criminal cases. 
" ( 3) The expenses necessarily incurred in the 
support of persons charged with or com·icted of 
erime and committed therefor to the county jail. 
. . . 
"(9) Everv other sum directed by law to be 
raised for nn); county purposes under the direc-
5 
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tiou of the board of county commissioners, or de-
clared to be a county charge." 
It is clear from a reading of the foregoing statute 
that, even though the necessary expenses of the county 
attorney incurred in criminal cases arising in the coun-
ty, all other expenses necessarily incurred by him in the 
prosecution of criminal cases and the expenses necessar-
ily incurred in the support of person charged with or 
convicted of crime and committed therefor to the county 
jail are made proper county charges, the statute does 
not make reasonable compensation and expenses paid to 
court-appointed defense counsel a proper county charge. 
We recognize that upon the enactment of Section 6 of 
Chapter 64 of Title 77, which was added to the Utah 
Code by the Chapter Laws of 1965, reasonable compen-
sation and expenses paid by the counties of the State of 
Utah to court-appointed defense counsel became a proper 
county charge. However, prior to enactment of said Sec-
tion 6 such a payment of compensation and expenses was 
not a proper county charge and the county could not 
make the same under any provision of the law. 
We believe that the legislature in enacting said Sec-
tion 6 intended only to make it possible for counties to do 
that which they were not permitted by law to do before 
enactment of said Section as is evidenced by the use of 
the permissive word "may" in said Section. The lan-
guage used throughout Chapter 64 of said Title 77, where 
county charges are discussed, is permissive in nature 
and nowhere therein does it appear that the legislature 
6 
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intended to make it mandatory upon the counties to pro-
Yide reasonable compensation and expenses to court-
appointed defense counsel. 
Section 5 provides : 
''The expenses of printing or typewriting 
briefs on appeal on behalf of a defendant as well 
as depositions and other transcripts are also a 
proper county charge." (Emphasis added) 
Section 7 provides : 
''All expenditures by the counties of incorpo-
rated cities and towns which are necessary and 
proper to carry out the purposes defined in this 
chapter are hereby declared to be legitimate amd 
proper uses of public funds and the co1mties and 
incorporated areas of this state are hereby au-
thorized to levy and collect taxes for such pur-
poses." (Emphasis added) 
Section 6 provides: 
"The board of county commissioners may, at 
county expense, either: ... " (Emphasis added) 
All of the foregoing language used by the legisla-
ture is permissive in nature and not mandatory and Re-
spondent contends that had the legislature intended the 
act to be mandatory on the question of payment of rea-
sonable compensation and expenses it would have used 
mandatory language such as the word "shall" in place 
of the word "may." 
·whether a statute is mandatory or directory de-
pends upon the legislative intent. See De Witt v. Board 
of Supen:isors of the County of San Diego, 53 C. 2d 419, 
7 
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348 P. 2d 567, California (1960). The word "may" is 
sometimes construed as mandatory, but where a means is 
not provided for enforcement of the statute in which 
the word is used the declaration is directory and not 
mandatory. See Goicanlock L Turner, 42 C. 2c1 296, 26i 
P. 2d 310, California ( 1954). A direction in a statute is 
mandatory where consequences are attached to failure to 
act in accordance with the direction. See Whitley v. 
S11perior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 113 P. 
2d 449, California ( 1941). 
~owhere in Chapter 64 of Title 77 is a means pro-
vided for enforcement of the provisions of Section 6 and 
nowhere in said chapter can one find consequences at-
tached to a failure to act in accordance with the provi-
sions of said Section. It was the obvious intent of the 
legislature in enacting Chapter 64 of Title 77 to set up 
minimum standards to be provided by each county for 
the defense of indigent defendants, but to leaYe the means 
of providing such minimum standards within the sole 
disC'retion of the respective counties and to make it pos-
sible> for the counties, only if in their discretion they 
choose to do so, to provide compensation for defense 
counsel. 
Respondent contends that proper appointment in 
accordance with prescribed statutory procedure by a 
C'onrt having authority is a necessary prerequisite to 
P<'yrrn·nt of compensation to an attorne~- who has per-
form0d sen-ices on behalf of an indigent accused. The 
Supreme Court of Minnesota, in consiclrring a statute 
wl1ieh provided for the appointment of counsel to defend 
8 
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indigent defendants and allowed reasonable compensa-
tion to defense counsel for his services, stated that it was 
<lrsirable to set forth a declaration of policy as to the 
appointment of attorneys to assist indigent convicted 
persons to prosecute an appeal and held that payment for 
such services could be authorized only in cases where the 
attorney had been appointed to assist the Defendant in 
the trial court according to the prescribed statutory pro-
cedure. State v. Dahlgren, 259 Minn. 307, 107 N.W. 
2d 299, l\Iinnesota (1961). 
In volume 18 of ALR 3d at page 1087 it is stated: 
''The New York statute with respect to the 
assignment of counsel for an indigent defendant 
provides that if the defendant appears for an 
arraignment without an attorney, he must be 
asked if he desires the aid of counsel, and if he 
does, the Court must assign counsel to him. Un-
der this statute, it has been held that the validity 
of an order purporting to award compensation 
for services performed in behalf of the indigent 
depends upon the validity of the assignment." 
Respondent contends that since the Board of County 
Commissioners of Summit County, prior to the appoint-
ment by the District Court of Summit County of Appel-
lants to represent Defendant, had taken no affirmative 
adim: pursuant to the provisions of 77-64-6, UCA, 1953, 
rompensation should not now be awarded to Appellants 
since they were not appointed in accordance with the pre-
scrihecl statutory procedure set forth in said section. 
Respondent further contends that should the Court 
fincl that the language of said Section 6 is mandatory, the 
9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
proper remedy would be a Writ of Mandamus brought to 
compel the Board of County Commissioners to arrange 
for the services provided and that this arrangement 
would haYe to be made prior to appointment of counsel 
b~, the District Court. 
Respondent does not contend that the Legislature of 
the State of Utah does not have the power to provide 
comprnsation for services rendered by court-appointed 
defem:e counsel. What Respondent does contend, how-
eYer, is that although the Legislature of the State of 
Utah has now made it possible for counties to provide 
such legal services and to compensate court-appointed 
couusel for indigent defendants, it has left the question 
of compensation within the sole discretion of the board 
of county commissioners of each county and until the 
commissioners take some affirmative action, as they are 
authorized to do by Section 6 of the act, the Court is not 
authorized to fix compensation and order its payment. 
·we therefore submit that the ruling of the District 
Court should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE PROCEDURE UNDERTAKEN BY AP-
PELLANTS TO SECURE COl\fPENSATION 
"\\T AS INAPPROPRIATE. 
If, as admitted by Appellants at pages 12 and 1:1 
of their hrief, the Governmental Immunity Act does 11ot 
apply in this case then they would necessarily han to 
look to the Counsel for Indegent Defendants Act (77-64-1 
10 
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to 7) or the County Claims Act (17-15-10 to 16) for a pro-
cedural means of securing the compensation they are 
requesting, if they are entitled to any such compensation. 
It would appear that the Counsel for Indigent De-
fendants Act should not apply in this case since the 
Board of County Commissioners of Summit County has 
not authorized the Court to appoint Counsel and award 
them reasonable compensation and expenses (R. 81, pp. 
12 and 14) pursuant to the provisions of the act, and the 
said act makes no provision for any means of enforce-
ment if compensation is not paid by the county, nor are 
there any consequences attached to a failure of the coun-
ty to provide compensation or to take affirmative action 
in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act. 
Appellants contend that the Counsel for Indigent 
Deft>ndants Act is remedial in nature and that it is en-
titled to liberal construction in favor of the remedy pro-
Yi<led by law or in favor of those entitled to the bene-
fits of the statute. Though the act may be remedial in 
nature, still the intention of the legislature as gathered 
from the language used must be given full effect. In 
:JO Am. Jur., Statutes, Section 393, it is stated: 
"As in the case of all statutes, the primary 
rule of construction of remedial statutes is to 
ascertain, declare and give effect to the intention 
of the legislature, as gathered from the language 
used .... '' 
He:-;pondent contends that it was the intent of the 
lT tali State Legislature in enacting the provisions of the 
( 'on11s0l for Indigent Defendants Act, on the question of 
11 
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compensation, only to make it possible for counties to 
provide funds for what was not, prior to the enactment 
of said act, a proper county charge. The intent of the 
Legislature that said act not he mandatory 011 the ques-
tion of compensation is further supportell lly the fact 
that the Legislature did not provide any means of en-
forcing the provisions of the act nor attach any consP-
qr<ences to a failure of the counties to act in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 6. 
No remedy being provided in the Counse 1 for Indi-
gent Defendants Act, a claimant must then turn to the 
County Claims Act if it has a claim against the County. ' 
Appellants did, in fact, pursuant to the terms and pro-
visions of the County Claims Act, present a written 
clnim (R. 67) to Respondent which said claim was re-
jected (R. 70A). Title 17, Chapter 15, Section 12, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"A claimant dissatisfied icith the rejection of 
his claim or demand or with the amount allowed 
him on his account may sue the county therefor at 
any time within one year after the first rejection 
thereof by the board, but not afterward. If in 
such action judgment is recovered for more than 
the hoard allo\ved, costs shall be taxed against the 
county, hut if no more is recovered than the board 
allowed, costs shall be taxed against plaintiff. On 
presentation of a certified copy of the judgment 
the hoard must allow and pay the same." (Em-
phasis added) 
If Appellants are dissatisfied with the r0jcction of 
thrir elaim their only remedy would be to sue the count)· 
the>rc•for within one year after the first rejection thereof 
12 
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by the Board of County Commissioners. Appellants have 
not sued Respondent Summit County in this case and the 
case is not, therefore, properly before the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
rrhe District Court properly denied Appellants' mo-
tion for an order awarding them a reasonable attorney's 
fee in connection with their court-appointed representa-
tion of Defendant. A county of the State of Utah does 
not have a statutory obligation to pay reasonable com-
pensation and expenses to court-appointed defense coun-
sC>l, hut may do so where the board of county commission-
ers of such county authorizes the Court to appoint a 
<1nalified attorney and award him reasonable compensa-
tion and expenses. The Board of County Commissioners 
of Summit County has not authorized the Court to ap-
point a qualified attorney and award him reasonable 
compensation and expenses. The procedure undertaken 
by Appellants to secure compensation was an inappro-
priate procedure and the case is not properly before 
the Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
Summit County Attorney 
.Attorney for Respondent 
Summit County 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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